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subject headings—“Subsistence Protest, Violence, and Criminality;” “Passive
Burghers, Trigger-Happy Soldiers, Distrustful Workers”—read like legends for
a series of vignettes, more descriptive than analytic.
Valuable is Schumann’s questioning of the extent to which popular paramili-
tarism—much attention is given to the Einwohnerwehren studied decades ago by
James Diehl—was linked to an actual willingness on the part of the bourgeoisie
to practice counterrevolutionary violence. Schumann is quite right in stressing the
diversity of motivations that led rural and urban burgers to sign onto paramilitary
formations, and also in emphasizing the relatively nuanced attitudes (e.g., toward
working-class strikes) that, if the radical right had been less successful in seizing the
interpretive high ground with respect to the responsibility for the war and to the
legitimacy of working-class demands, might have led to a very different outcome
in Germany. Issues of gender that have figured prominently in recent scholarship
on Weimar radicalism and political violence make a necessary appearance,
although no one central theoretical perspective informs the study; rather, the
study finds its greatest strength in a careful consideration of the various modalities
of political violence, and of the consequences of that violence for the fate of the
republic.
Schumann for the most part avoids the danger of reifying “political violence”
into a hermetic phenomenon, separate from the battle over meaning of which it
was only a part; sometimes explicit, more often implicit, in the study is the notion
that struggles over public space were also simultaneously struggles over discursive
space, and it is here that the study most engages with the scholarly questions of the
future. In noting that political violence was the product of choices made by
political actors rather than the result of irresistible forces—and by emphasizing
the corollary that the destruction of the first German democracy was far from
inevitable—Schumann issues a pertinent warning while making a first-rate




Know Your Enemy: The American Debate on Nazism, 1933–1945. By
Michaela Hoenicke Moore. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2010. Pp. 390. Cloth $85.00. ISBN 9780521829694.
Michaela Moore’s excellent new study is a deeply researched, well-written, and
analytically sharp intellectual history of how Americans struggled to understand
the origins of, and the extent of the German people’s responsibility for,
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Nazism in the years 1933–45. It explains how the American understanding of
both had important consequences for U.S. policy toward occupied Germany.
And it concludes with a provocative paradox—that the United States’ success
in reconstructing Germany after World War II was based on a fundamental mis-
understanding of Nazism, one that underestimated its ideological fanaticism as
well as the German people’s commitment to it. In showing how the
Americans paradoxically ultimately got their policy right despite getting their
history wrong, Moore’s book provides new confirmation of Hegel’s much-
cited adage that the only thing we learn from history is that we learn nothing
from history.
One of the great virtues ofKnow Your Enemy is that it exposes the blind spots in
present-day American memory of World War II. If today most Americans view
the conflict as a black and white battle of Allied good against Axis “evil,”Moore
shows how Americans at the time of the war itself were unable to agree on what
the fight against Germany was actually about. There was no single American view
of Nazism and the Germans, but rather a multiplicity of competing perspectives
that jostled constantly with one another for domestic dominance. In contrast to
the American view of the Japanese, which was far more monolithic and saturated
with undeniable racism, the American view of the Germans was far more
nuanced.
Many reasons account for this fact, but an important one was that most
Americans had an overwhelmingly positive image of Germany and the
German people in the years prior to the Nazi takeover. Favorable attitudes
toward German immigrants dating back to the nineteenth century and interwar
revisionist histories that exonerated the Kaiserreich for starting World War I pre-
vented many Americans from being too critical of the Nazi dictatorship after its
establishment in 1933. Opinions thus diverged sharply in the years before World
War II about how deeply Nazism was rooted in German political, social, and cul-
tural traditions. This de facto debate about the Sonderweg pitted many groups and
historical explanations against one another. For example, American journalists
based in Europe, such as William Shirer and Edgar Ansel Mowrer, were fiercely
anti-Nazi, saw Hitler’s dictatorship as having deep German roots, and tended
toward an interventionist foreign policy, while the domestic American media,
led by Time Magazine and the Saturday Evening Post, saw the Nazi regime as just
another pragmatic great power that was best handled from an isolationist stance
of nonconfrontation. Yet, even among journalists based in Germany there
were disagreements, with the otherwise anti-Nazi writer Dorothy Thompson
insisting on the existence of the “other Germany” and believing that fascism
was not an exclusively German phenomenon.
There were further disagreements within the American political establishment
and American society. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) leaned
toward a Sonderweg explanation of Nazism, partly because of his childhood
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encounters with German militarism (he briefly attended school in Germany in
1891). Yet, Roosevelt had to keep his suspicions of the German people somewhat
to himself, as public opinion polls during the war repeatedly showed that a
majority of Americans continued to differentiate between the German citizenry
and the Nazi leadership (only five percent of Americans in 1942 believed that the
U.S. was at war with the German people; sixty-two percent said they did not hate
them; and sixty-seven percent in 1943 believed Germany could be easily reinte-
grated into the postwar order—as opposed to eight percent who believed the
same about Japan). Beyond disagreements with the American people, FDR
faced opposition from the War and State Departments about how to diagnose
the source of, and devise a solution for, the “German problem.” In 1944, the
leaders of both departments believed that Nazism derived from contingent
factors, such as the unjust Versailles settlement, and did not have deep roots in
German culture. They further believed in the Germans’ capacity to embrace
democracy and thus called for “winning German hearts” through a mild occu-
pation policy rooted in reconstruction (which unsurprisingly served the depart-
ments’ respective agendas of facilitating military occupation and economic
revival).
It is a truism by now that this reconstructionist approach ultimately succeeded
in paving the way for Germany’s ultimate rehabilitation and democratization. Yet
Moore admirably strives to rescue the reputation of the losers in the debate over
how to treat postwar Germany. The losing camp included the proponents of a
“hard” peace, such as FDR’s Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau,
and the lobbying organization, the Society for the Prevention of World War
III. They and others like them sympathized with Germany’s victims, especially
the Jews, and were committed to achieving justice for the crimes perpetrated
against them by the Nazi leadership and its German supporters. The hard
peace camp was convinced that the Germans needed to realize they had lost
the war (something they had not realized after 1918) by imposing a harsh
peace upon the country, defined by policies of territorial partition and deindus-
trialization. Moore makes clear that the “Morgenthau Plan” was hardly the
notorious expression of “revenge” that its detractors have long made it out to
be and shows that it was not outside the mainstream of views within the U.S. gov-
ernment. Moreover, she shows how domestic American opposition to the plan
was tinged with anti-Semitism (it was seen as expressive of a Jewish drive for ven-
geance and antithetical to Christian “charity”).
Most importantly, she shows that, however successful it may have been, the
mild American policy of reconstruction “came at the cost of a general popular rec-
ognition of the true nature of the Nazi regime and the deep complicity of
German society in the regime’s crimes” (p. 346). Given Moore’s assertion that
“recent scholarship … corroborates the picture of a broadly nazified society
that was not easily able to shed its authoritarian ways” after 1945, it would be
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interesting to know whether she thinks the success of the postwar Federal
Republic occurred despite, or because of, American ignorance of the nation’s
true political leanings. Might history have turned out differently, with a more
satisfying moral outcome, had the hard peace camp won the day and held the
German people accountable for their complicity in the Nazis’ crimes? By the
same token, were there not major risks in the reconstructionist camp’s mild
approach that could have ended in catastrophe (for example, a Nazi revival and
World War III, as the Society for the Prevention of World War III continued
to warn about well into the 1950s)? Such all-too-historical questions are impossi-
ble to answer with any certainty. Yet, they deserve to be kept in mind, for they
help us resist Whiggish views of Germany’s postwar success and remind us of its
moral price tag.
In the end, readers of Know Your Enemymay remain uncertain whether it ulti-
mately mattered that American policy makers never really “knew” the German
enemy. Yet the book provides a great service by prompting us to think more





The Reluctant Revolutionary: Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Collision with
Prusso-German History. By John A. Moses. Berghahn Books:
New York. 2009. Pp. 298, Appendices, Bibliography, and Index.
Cloth $90.00. ISBN 978-1-84545-531-6.
John A. Moses has undertaken a seemingly monumental task: that of explaining
in one concise volume the special path that Dietrich Bonhoeffer pursued. His
work is not a biography of Bonhoeffer per se, nor is it an attempt to define
Bonhoeffer as a churchman-resister. Rather, it is an attempt to reveal how
Bonhoeffer’s thought became revolutionary both politically and theologically,
allowing him to make a break with his social and cultural upbringing. To that
end, Moses must combine the disciplines of both theology and history to high-
light successfully just how revolutionary Bonhoeffer became.
Chapter one sets the scene by exploring the “Sonderweg” or “peculiarity” of the
relationship between the educated German middle classes (Bildungsbürgertum) and
their Prussian state government. This special relationship meant extreme defer-
ence to authority, near-absolute trust in governmental authority, and the belief
that the state was the guarantor of order. Under the teachings of Martin
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